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ABSTRACT
Despite the excellent performance of neural-network-based audio
source separation methods and their wide range of applications, their
robustness against intentional attacks has been largely neglected. In
this work, we reformulate various adversarial attack methods for the
audio source separation problem and intensively investigate them
under different attack conditions and target models. We further pro-
pose a simple yet effective regularization method to obtain imper-
ceptible adversarial noise while maximizing the impact on separa-
tion quality with low computational complexity. Experimental re-
sults show that it is possible to largely degrade the separation quality
by adding imperceptibly small noise when the noise is crafted for the
target model. We also show the robustness of source separation mod-
els against a black-box attack. This study provides potentially useful
insights for developing content protection methods against the abuse
of separated signals and improving the separation performance and
robustness.
Index Terms— audio source separation, adversarial example
1. INTRODUCTION
Audio source separation has been intensively studied and widely
used for downstream tasks. For instance, various music informa-
tion retrieval tasks, including lyric recognition and alignment [1–3],
music transcription [4, 5], instrument classification [6], and singing
voice generation [7], rely on music source separation (MSS). Like-
wise, automatic speech recognition benefits from speech enhance-
ment and speech separation. Recent advances in source separation
methods based on deep neural networks (DNNs) have dramatically
improved the accuracy of separation and some methods perform
comparably to or even better than ideal-mask methods, which are
used as theoretical upper baselines [8–13]. Although powerful
DNN-based open-source libraries have become available [14–17]
and been used in the community, the robustness of source separa-
tion models against intentional attacks has been largely neglected.
However, understanding the robustness against intentional attacks is
important for the following reasons: (i) if one maliciously manipu-
lates audio in perceptually undetectable ways such that the separa-
tion quality degrades severely, as shown in Fig. 1, all downstream
tasks can fail; (ii) if creators do not want their audio contents to be
separated and reused, such manipulation can protect contents from
being separated with minimal and imperceptible perturbation from
the original content. The former is regarded as a defense against
the attack on the separation model, while the latter as the copyright
protection of content against the abuses of separated signals.
In this work, we address this problem by investigating various
adversarial attacks on audio source separation models. Adversarial
* Inoue contributed to the work while interning at Sony.
(a) Input mixture x
(c) Adversarial noise η
(b) Original separation f(x)
(d) Separation of adversarial example f(x+ η)
Fig. 1. Visualization of adversarial noise and its effect in time-
frequency domain. By adding the hardly perceptible adversarial
noise (c) to the input (a), the separation degrades drastically (d) from
the original separation (b).
examples were originally discovered in an image classification prob-
lem where examples only slightly different from correctly classified
examples drawn from the data distribution can be even confidently
misclassified by a DNN [18]. In [18], such adversarial examples
were created by adding small perturbations called adversarial noise
that maximize the image classification error. In many cases, such
perturbations are hardly perceptible, and the adversarial examples
generalize well across models with different architectures. As adver-
sarial examples can be critical for many applications, they have been
intensively investigated from different aspects including generation
methods [19], defending methods [20, 21], transferability [22, 23],
and the cause of networks’ vulnerabilities [24, 25].
Recently, adversarial attacks have also been investigated in au-
dio domains including speech recognition [26, 27], speaker recog-
nition [28], and audio event classification [29]. However, all these
works essentially address classification (or logistic regression) prob-
lems, and such models have similar properties, e.g., (i) they accept
high-dimensional data such as a spectrogram or waveform and out-
put a low-dimensional vector whose dimension is typically equal
to the number of classes, (ii) their architecture typically employs
a series of transformations from high resolution with a few-channel
representation to low resolution with many-channel representations,
(iii) the class prediction is done through softmax. In contrast, au-
dio source separation is a regression problem and has very different
properties: (i) the dimensionality of the output is high, typically the
same as the input, (ii) the model may employ a transformation from
a low-resolution representation to a high-resolution representation,
(iii) the model does not necessarily incorporate softmax at the final
output; the network can be trained to directly estimate real target
values. Therefore, it is not clear if adversarial examples exist, how
models behave against them, what type of attack is effective, and
how much transferable the adversarial example is on the source sep-
aration problem. In this paper, we address these questions and in-
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tensively investigate a variety of attacks under different conditions.
To our knowledge, this is the first work that investigates adversarial
examples for the regression problem in the audio domain.
The contributions of this work are summarized as follows:
1. We reformulate adversarial attack methods for audio source
separation; the reformulation does not require source signals
to calculate the audio adversarial examples.
2. We propose a simple yet effective regularization method that
can be used with reformulated attack methods by incorporating
psychoacoustic masking effects.
3. We investigate the reformulated attacks by using well-known
open-source MSS libraries and show how the source separa-
tion models are affected by the adversarial examples crafted
by different attack methods under different conditions.
4. We further investigate the transferability of adversarial exam-
ples to unseen models under black- and gray-box attack set-
tings and to untargeted sources in a white-box setting.
2. METHODS: ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS AGAINST
SOURCE SEPARATION MODELS
2.1. Gradient descent (GD)
Adversarial examples were originally crafted by promoting the mis-
classification of image classification networks [18]. In a similar way,
we can define a perturbation η for an audio source separation net-
work f(·) as a solution of a multidimensional regression problem:
max
η∈D
d(f(x+ η), f(x)), D = {η | C(η) < δ}, (1)
where x is the input audio, C is a constraint to limit the magnitude
of the perturbation, and δ is a threshold value. A typical choice of
C is the l2 norm ‖η‖2 or the supremum norm ‖η‖∞. d(·, ·) is a
metric and can be the l1 or l2 distance, or SI-SNR [30]. We used
the l2 distance in this work. The motivation of Eq. (1) is to craft a
hardly perceptible perturbation η that can maximize the difference of
network outputs. It is worth noting that, unlike adversarial attacks in
image or audio classification problems, Eq. (1) does not require any
label to estimate η, making the attack significantly practical because
one can calculate an adversarial example without having access to
the dataset on which the separation network f is trained. Eq. (1) can
be solved by minimizing the loss function L by gradient descent:
L(η) = −‖f(x+ η)− f(x)‖22 + λC(η), (2)
where λ is a scalar to control the regularization term.
2.2. Fast gradient sign method (FGSM)
Goodfellow et. al. attempted to explain the cause of adversarial ex-
amples by hypothesizing the linear nature of a DNN [24]. Consid-
ering that the dot product of the perturbation η and network weights
w can be maximized by assigning η = sign(w) under the max norm
constraint, FGSM calculates the perturbation as
η =  sign(∇xL(f(x), y)), (3)
where  is the magnitude of the perturbation, L(a, b) is the loss func-
tion, and y is a reference signal. In the original image classification
setting [24], L is the cross entropy loss and y is the target class label.
To apply FGSM for the audio source separation problem, we modify
Eq. (3) to use the mean square error lossL(a, b) = ‖a−b‖22 and pro-
vide the separated output with stopping gradient operation sg(f(x))
as a reference signal.
2.3. Projected gradient descent (PGD)
Eq. (3) can be seen as a single step scheme for maximizing the inner
part of the saddle point formulation. PGD extends and calculates the
perturbation by T iterative steps with smaller step size. After each
perturbation step, PGD projects the adversarial example back onto
the -ball of x if it goes beyond the -ball. Similarly to FGSM, we
apply PGD to the audio source separation problem as
xt+1 = Π
(
xt + α sign(∇xL(f(xt), sg(f(x)))
)
, (4)
where α is the step size and Π denotes the projection operation to
the -ball.
3. CONDITIONS: BLACK- AND GRAY-BOX ATTACKS
The methods introduced in Sec. 2 assume that the gradient infor-
mation of the target model is available for calculating the adversarial
example. This setting is regarded as the white-box setting and the ad-
versary has full access to the parameters of a target model. While the
white-box attack is applicable, for instance, on open-sourced soft-
ware, compiled software usually does not give access to the gradient
information. However, in some image classification problems, it is
known that some adversarial examples crafted for a model are of-
ten effective for various models with different architectures or mod-
els trained on different subsets of training data [18]. This property,
called transferability, is used to attack the target model without ac-
cessing the internal calculation pipeline (black-box setting). One can
directly apply white-box methods to a surrogate model and use the
created adversarial example to attack the target model. Although the
adversarial examples surprisingly generalize to untargeted models,
the black-box attack is often less effective than the white-box at-
tack. One way to improve the transferability to the target model is to
use prior knowledge about the target model architecture. In a gray-
box setting, the network architecture of the target model is assumed
to be known, while access to the network parameters is prohibited.
Although the target gradient information is still unavailable in the
gray-box setting, a model with the same architecture is assumed to
provide more similar gradient to the target model than a model with a
different architecture. Hence, the adversarial examples are expected
to exhibit better transferability.
4. INCORPORATING PSYCHOACOUSTIC MODEL
The perturbation η is desired to be imperceptible. In image classifi-
cation, this can be achieved by uniformly regularizing the magnitude
of perturbation in terms of the l2 norm ‖η‖2 or the supremum norm
‖η‖∞. However, in audio source separation, this is not the optimal
choice since the perceptibility of the perturbation depends highly on
the input signals. For example, low-level noise can be highly percep-
tible in silent regions, while high-level noise can be hardly audible
when a high-level signal exists. This phenomenon is referred to as
the masking effect, where a louder signal can make other signals at
nearby frequencies (frequency masking) or time (time masking) im-
perceptible. Previous works attempted to incorporate the masking
effect by using an external MP3 encoder [28] or by the iterative es-
timation of masking thresholds [31]. However, the optimization of
a loss function with such a regularization term is often difficult and
slow to converge. Here, we propose a simple yet effective regular-
ization method using the short-term power ratio (STPR) of the input
and adversarial noise as
CSTPR(η) = ‖ϑ(η, l)/ϑ(x, l)‖1, (5)
where ϑ(η, l) = [η¯1, · · · , η¯N ] is the patch-wise l2 norm function
with window length l, and η¯n = ‖(η(n−1)l, · · · , ηnl)‖2 is the l2
norm of patch index n. ϑ can be implemented by using an aver-
age pooling function, which is commonly available in deep learning
libraries. In contrast to previous methods, CSTPR(η) does not in-
volve an external MP3 encoder or an iterative estimation process
of the masking threshold and can be efficiently calculated, which is
particularly important for iterative methods such as GD and PGD.
Although Eq. (5) does not explicitly consider the masking threshold,
we found that it regularizes the adversarial signal well enough to
achieve hardly perceptible adversarial noise depending on the input
signal level without hindering the convergence.
5. EXPERIMENTS
5.1. Setup
We conducted experiments on the MUSDB18 dataset, prepared for
SiSEC 2018 [32]. In the dataset, a mixture and its four sources,
bass, drums, other, and vocals, recorded in stereo format at 44.1
kHz, are available for each song. We used vocals as a target instru-
ment for attacks. Two open-source MSS libraries are considered,
namely, Open-Unmix (UMX) [15] and Demucs [16]. UMX per-
forms separation in the frequency domain with bidirectional LSTM
layers, while Demucs performs separation in the time domain with
convolutional neural networks (CNNs). We used publicly available
pretrained models, which did not use the MUSDB test set for train-
ing, and evaluated the adversarial attacks on the test set.
5.2. Evaluation metric
Two important factors for evaluating adversarial examples are (i)
How much does the adversarial example degrade the separation
quality? and (ii) How strong (or perceptible) is the perturbation?
To objectively evaluate these factors, we defined three metrics based
on the signal-to-distortion ratio (SDR). Let x, y, and η be the in-
put mixture, target source, and adversarial noise, respectiveely, and
SDR(y, yˆ) be the SDR of yˆ with reference y. We defined
SDRd = SDR(y, f(x))− SDR(y, f(x+ η)), (6)
SDRdadd = SDR(y, f(x))− SDR(y, f(x) + η), (7)
SDRin = SDR(x, x+ η). (8)
SDRd indicates how much the SDR is degraded by adding the ad-
versarial noise compared with the separation of the original sam-
ple. SDRdadd and SDRin are the metrics for evaluating the noise
level. SDRin directly evaluates the SDR of the adversarial example
against the original input while SDRdadd evaluates how much the
SDR is degraded if the adversarial noise is directly added to the orig-
inal separation. All SDR values were computed using the museval
package and the median over all tracks of the median of the metric
over each track is reported, as in SiSEC 2018 [32].
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Fig. 2. Comparison of attack methods against UMX with different
adversarial noise levels.
5.3. White-box attack
Attack method. First, we compared three attack methods,
namely, GD, PGD, and FGSM, with different adversarial noise
levels. For GD, we performed 300 iterations and λ was set to
(90, 170, 290, 500). For PGD and FGSM,  and α were set to (0.05,
0.1, 0.2, 0.5). Results of attacks against UMX are shown in Fig. 2.
The SDR degradation becomes more prominent as the adversarial
noise level becomes high for GD and PGD, while the SDRd of
FGSM remains around 0.4 dB. This suggests that FGSM is not very
effective in attacking the source separation model. Both GD and
PGD introduce significant SDR degradation with very low level ad-
versarial noise. Since GD consistently led to more significant SDR
degradation in the entire input SDR range than PGD, we used GD
for the rest of our experiments.
Power ratio regularization. Fig. 1 shows an example of the
waveform and the spectrogram of (a) the input mixture, (b) the
original separation, (c) the adversarial noise, and (d) the separation
of the adversarial example. The target model was Demucs. By
comparing the mixture with the adversarial noise, it can be seen that
noise does not exist in the silent region at the beginning but becomes
more prominent when the level of the input mixture is high. This
helps to make the adversarial noise imperceptible by the masking
effect. When we regularize the adversarial noise with the l2 norm,
we obtain adversarial noise that spreads across time and is much
more audible in silent or low-level input regions than adversarial
noise crafted with the proposed STPR regularization with a similar
SDRd. To validate this, we conducted a subjective test in similarly
to the double-blind triple-stimulus with hidden reference format
(ITU-R BS.1116), where the reference was the original mixture
and either A or B was the same as the reference and the other was
an adversarial example crafted with either the l2 or STPR regu-
larization. The subjects were asked to identify which of A and B
was the same as the reference signal. Twelve participants evaluated
nine audio clips of 6 s duration, resulted in 99 evaluations for each
method. The results in Table 1 show that the accuracy of identifying
the adversarial examples crafted with the proposed STPR is almost
equal to the chance rate (50%), showing that the STPR success-
fully produced inaudible adversarial examples, while the adversarial
examples crafted with l2 regularization that have almost the same
SDRd as the STPR can be identified frequently. This shows that
the simple STPR is good enough to obtain hardly perceptible ad-
versarial noise that significantly degrades the separation quality by
considering the masking effect.
Table 1. Comparison of regularization methods.
Method SDRin [dB] SDRd [dB] Accuracy
l2 28.83 5.25 75.9%
STPR 30.33 5.23 52.8%
Table 2. Comparison of model and domain difference (in dB).
Model noise domain SDRin SDRd SDRdadd
UMX frequency 37.04 2.66 0.01
UMX time 36.70 2.50 0.04
Demucs time 37.08 5.83 0.03
Target models and attack domain. We also compared the time
domain model (Demucs) and frequency domain model (UMX). For
UMX, we computed the adversarial example either in the time do-
main by back-propagating the error through the short-time Fourier
transform (STFT) operation or in the frequency domain and trans-
formed the obtained adversarial example to the time domain signal
using the Griffin–Lim algorithm. Table 2 shows that for all the target
models and noise injection domains, subtle noise with SDRdadd of
less than 0.05 dB significantly degraded the SDRs. Demucs is much
more prone to adversarial attacks than UMX. Comparing the results
for the adversarial noise calculation domain for attacking UMX,
designing in the frequency domain is slightly more effective as it
achieved higher SDRd with higher SDRin.
Effects on untargeted instruments. UMX and Demucs are
trained to separate the four sources as defined in MUSDB. There-
fore, it is interesting to see how the adversarial example crafted for
one target instrument affects the separation of untargeted instru-
ments. For this, we compared SDRd values of the four instruments
in Table 3. As observed, the effects on untargeted instruments de-
pend on the instrument, e.g., bass has only negligible effects while
other exhibits some degradation. This implies that the instruments
whose frequency characteristics overlap with the target instrument
could be more impacted than non-overlapping instruments.
Discussion. An important observation from the listening test is
that the separation of the adversarial example degrades separation
results in degradation in which the target source is suppressed or the
level of contamination of other instrument sounds in the mixture is
increased, but not degradation involving the creation of irrelevant
artificial noise. This is interesting because Eq. (2) does not impose
any such constraint and the distance ‖f(x+η)−f(x)‖22 can be max-
imized by, for example, introducing a stationary noise. The results
could be reasonable for mask-based separation approaches, where
masks are estimated by separation models and applied to the input
mixture to obtain the separated signal. The mask-based approaches
include frequency-domain methods that use Wiener filtering such
as UMX or time-domain approaches such as Conv-TasNet [13].
However, we observed the same tendency for non-mask-based ap-
proaches, which directly estimate the target signal in the time or
frequency domain without explicit masking scheme, such as De-
mucs or MDenseNet [33] without Wiener filtering. We hypothesize
that even for the non-mask-based approaches, the networks learn the
masking strategy internally, and therefore the adversarial examples
are crafted in a way that increases the interference of other sources
Table 3. SDRd comparison of target (vocals) and untargeted in-
struments (in dB).
Model vocals drums bass other
UMX 2.66 0.14 0.06 0.67
Demucs 5.83 1.30 0.09 3.19
Table 4. Comparison of white-, gray-, and black-box attacks.
Condition Source Target SDRd [dB] SDRin [dB]
black-box
UMX Demucs 0.33 37.04
Demucs UMX 0.19 37.08
Demucs TASNet 0.52 37.08
gray-box Demucs Demucsex 1.20 37.08
white-box Demucs Demucs 5.83 37.08UMX UMX 2.66 37.04
in the mixture or suppresses the target source.
5.4. Black- and gray-box attacks
Finally, we investigated the robustness of audio source separation
models against black- and gray-box attacks. To this end, the adver-
sarial examples were first crafted for the source models and eval-
uated on target models that have different network architecture or
parameters. In addition to UMX and Demucs, we also used TASNet
and Demucsex, available in [16], as target models. TASNet is an-
other time-domain MSS model trained on MUSDB, while Demucsex
has same the network architecture as Demucs but was trained with
extra data, and thus Demucsex was used for the evaluation of the
gray-box attack. Table 4 shows the SDRd values under the condition
of SDRin ' 37 dB. The results show that the SDRd of the black-
box attack is much lower than that of the white-box attack. This sug-
gests the robustness of source separation models against black-box
attack, or in other words, adversarial examples are less transferable,
which indicates robustness of systems that involve source separa-
tion. In contrast, to protect the audio content from the abuse of the
separation, the transferability of adversarial examples should be be
improved. Comparing the target models TASNet and UMX with
the source model Demucs, TASNet had stronger impact than UMX,
probably owing to the similarity of their network architectures since
both Demucs and TASNet work on time-domain signals and their
architectures are based on a CNN. This claim is further supported by
the results of the gray-box attack as Demucsex had stronger impact
than the black-box attack.
6. CONCLUSION
We investigated various adversarial attacks under various conditions
on audio source separation methods by reformulating the adversarial
attack methods on classification models. To achieve imperceptible
adversarial noise while maximizing the impact with low complexity,
we proposed a simple short-term power ratio regularization. Exten-
sive experimental results show that some adversarial attack methods
can significantly degrade the separation performance with impercep-
tible adversarial noise under the white-box condition, while source
separation models exhibit robustness under the black-box condition.
7. REFERENCES
[1] Annamaria Mesaros and Tuomas Virtanen, “Recognition of
phonemes and words in singing,” in Proc. ICASSP, 2010.
[2] Hiromasa Fujihara, Masataka Goto, Jun Ogata, and Hiroshi G.
Okuno, “LyricSynchronizer: Automatic Synchronization Sys-
tem Between Musical Audio Signals and Lyrics,” IEEE Jour-
nal of Selected Topics in Signal Processing, vol. 5, no. 6, pp.
1252 – 1261, 2011.
[3] B. Sharma, C. Gupta, H. Li, and Y. Wang, “Automatic lyrics-
to-audio alignment on polyphonic music using singing-adapted
acoustic models,” in Proc. ICASSP, 2019, pp. 396–400.
[4] Olivier Gillet and Gae¨l Richard, “Transcription and separation
of drum signals from polyphonic music,” Trans. Audio Speech
and Language Processing, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 529 – 540, 2008.
[5] Ethan Manilow, Prem Seetharaman, and Bryan Pardo, “Simul-
taneous separation and transcription of mixtures with multi-
ple polyphonic and percussive instruments,” in Proc. ICASSP,
2020.
[6] Juan S. Go´mez, Jakob Abeßer, and Estefanı´a Cano, “Jazz solo
instrument classification with convolutional neural networks,
source separation, and transfer learning,” in Proc. ISMIR,
2018, pp. 577–584.
[7] Jen-Yu Liu, Yu-Hua Chen, Yin-Cheng Yeh, and Yi-Hsuan
Yang, “Score and lyrics-free singing voice generation,” CoRR,
vol. abs/1912.11747, 2019.
[8] Andreas Jansson, Eric J. Humphrey, Nicola Montecchio,
Rachel M. Bittner, Aparna Kumar, and Tillman Weyde,
“Singing voice separation with deep u-net convolutional net-
works,” in ISMIR, 2017, pp. 745–751.
[9] Naoya Takahashi and Yuki Mitsufuji, “Multi-scale multi-band
DenseNets for audio source separation,” in Proc. WASPAA,
2017, pp. 261–265.
[10] Naoya Takahashi, Nabarun Goswami, and Yuki Mitsufuji,
“MMDenseLSTM: An efficient combination of convolutional
and recurrent neural networks for audio source separation,” in
Proc. IWAENC, 2018.
[11] Jie Hwan Lee, Hyeong-Seok Choi, and Kyogu Lee, “Audio
query-based music source separation,” in Proc. ISMIR, 2019.
[12] Jen-Yu Liu and Yi-Hsuan Yang, “Dilated convolution with di-
lated GRU for music source separation,” in Proc. International
Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), 2019.
[13] Yi Luo and Nima Mesgarani, “Conv-TasNet: Surpassing
ideal time–frequency magnitude masking for speech separa-
tion,” Trans. Audio, Speech, and Language Processing, 2019.
[14] Ethan Manilow, Prem Seetharaman, and Bryan Pardo, “The
northwestern university source separation library,” in Proc. IS-
MIR, 2018, pp. 297–305.
[15] F.-R. Sto¨ter, Stefan Uhlich, A. Liutkus, and Yuki Mitsufuji,
“Open-Unmix - a reference implementation for music source
separation,” Journal of Open Source Software, 2019.
[16] Alexandre De´fossez, Nicolas Usunier, Le´on Bottou, and Fran-
cis Bach, “Music source separation in the waveform domain,”
arXiv preprint arXiv:1911.13254, 2019.
[17] Romain Hennequin, Anis Khlif, Felix Voituret, and Manuel
Moussallam, “Spleeter: a fast and efficient music source sep-
aration tool with pre-trained models,” Journal of Open Source
Software, vol. 5, no. 50, pp. 2154, 2020, Deezer Research.
[18] Christian Szegedy, Wojciech Zaremba, Ilya Sutskever, Joan
Bruna, Dumitru Erhan, Ian J. Goodfellow, and Rob Fergus,
“Intriguing properties of neural networks,” in Proc. ICLR,
2014.
[19] Jiawei Su, Danilo Vasconcellos Vargas, and Kouichi Sakurai,
“One pixel attack for fooling deep neural networks,” IEEE
Trans. Evolutionary Computation, vol. 23, no. 5, pp. 828–841,
2019.
[20] Aleksander Madry, Aleksandar Makelov, Ludwig Schmidt,
Dimitris Tsipras, and Adrian Vladu, “Towards deep learning
models resistant to adversarial attacks,” in Proc. ICLR, 2018.
[21] Yang Bai, Yan Feng, Yisen Wang, Tao Dai, Shu-Tao Xia, and
Yong Jiang, “Hilbert-based generative defense for adversarial
examples,” in Proc. ICCV, 2019.
[22] Yinpeng Dong, Fangzhou Liao, Tianyu Pang, Hang Su, Jun
Zhu, Xiaolin Hu, and Jianguo Li, “Boosting adversarial attacks
with momentum,” in Proc. CVPR, 2018.
[23] Dongxian Wu, Yisen Wang, Shu-Tao Xia, James Bailey, and
Xingjun Ma, “Skip connections matter: On the transferability
of adversarial examples generated with resnets,” in Proc. ICLR,
2020.
[24] Ian J. Goodfellow, Jonathon Shlens, and Christian Szegedy,
“Explaining and harnessing adversarial examples,” in Proc.
ICLR, 2015.
[25] Andrew Ilyas, Shibani Santurkar, Dimitris Tsipras, Logan En-
gstrom, Brandon Tran, and Aleksander Madry, “Adversarial
examples are not bugs, they are features,” in Proc. NeurIPS,
2019.
[26] Juncheng B. Li, Shuhui Qu, Xinjian Li, Joseph Szurley, J. Zico
Kolter, and Florian Metze, “Adversarial music: Realworld au-
dio adversary against wake-word detection system,” in Proc.
NeurIPS, 2019.
[27] Lea Scho¨nherr, Katharina Kohls, Steffen Zeiler, Thorsten Holz,
and Dorothea Kolossa, “Real-time, universal, and robust ad-
versarial attacks against speaker recognition systems,” in
Proc. The Network and Distributed System Security Sympo-
sium (NDSS), 2019.
[28] Yi Xie, Cong Shi, Zhuohang Li, Jian Liu, Yingying Chen, and
Bo Yuan, “Adversarial attacks against automatic speech recog-
nition systems via psychoacoustic hiding,” in Proc. ICASSP,
2020.
[29] Vinod Subramanian, Arjun Pankajakshan, Emmanouil Bene-
tos, Ning Xu, and SKoT McDonald Mark Sandler, “A study on
the transferability of adversarial attacks in sound event classi-
fication,” in Proc. ICASSP, 2020.
[30] Yusuf Isik, Jonathan Le Roux, Zhuo Chen, Shinji Watanabe,
and John R Hershey, “Single-channel multi-speaker separation
using deep clustering,” in Proc. Interspeech, 2016.
[31] Yao Qin, Nicholas Carlini, Ian Goodfellow, Garrison Cottrell,
and Colin Raffel, “Imperceptible, robust, and targeted adver-
sarial examples for automatic speech recognition,” in Proc.
ICML, 2019.
[32] A. Liutkus, F.-R. Sto¨ter, and N. Ito, “The 2018 signal separa-
tion evaluation campaign,” in Proc LVA/ICA, 2018.
[33] Naoya Takahashi, Purvi Agrawal, Nabarun Goswami, and Yuki
Mitsufuji, “Phasenet: Discretized phase modeling with deep
neural networks for audio source separation,” in Proc. Inter-
speech, 2018, pp. 3244–3248.
